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Federal Registration of Judgments Act Allows
Execution Upon Foreign Judgment Although
Suii on Judgment Is Time Barred in
Registration State-Stanford v. Utley*
Appellant obtained a money judgment against appellee in a
Mississippi federal court and registered it the next day in a Missouri
federal court, pursuant to section 1963 of Title 28 of the United
States Code.1 Seven and one-half years later appellant gave notice
in Missouri of his intention to take appellee's deposition to discover
assets in that state with which to satisfy the judgment. Appellee's
motion to prohibit the deposition was sustained on the ground that
no execution could issue upon any assets uncovered, since under
applicable Missouri law2 no action could be brought there on a
Mississippi judgment more than seven years old; the necessity of a

• 341 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1965).
1. Section 1963, 62 Stat. 958 (1948), provides in pertinent part:

"A judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property now or hereafter
entered in any district court which has become final by appeal or expiration of
time for appeal may be registered in any other district by filing therein a certified copy of such judgment. A judgment so registered shall have the same effect
as a judgment of the district court of the district where registered and may be
enforced in like manner. • • ."
"There seems little to say [about the enactment of the statute] except to express surprise that it was not done sooner." Goodrich, Yielding Place to New-Rest Versus Motion in the Conflict of Laws, 50 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 881, 890-91 (1950). ·
2. Missouri conflict of laws rules were held applicable in the principal case under
the rule of Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). See Stanford v. Utley,
341 F.2d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1965) (hereinafter cited as principal case). See also text
accompanying notes 14 8: 15 infra. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.180 (1949), a provision commonly called a borrowing statute, requires Missouri courts to apply the statute of
limitations of the state in which the original judgment was rendered to suits upon
that judgment in Missouri. MISS. CODE ANN. ch. 2, § 733 (1942), demands that all actions in Mississippi founded on a judgment of a Mississippi court be brought within
seven years after the rendition of the judgment.
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suit in Missouri to enforce the original judgment was not alleviated
by the fact that it had been registered in Missouri within seven
years of its rendition. On appeal, held, reversed. Although suit in
Missouri on the Mississippi judgment would be time barred at
present, appellant's registration of his judgment in a Missouri federal
court the day after its rendition in Mississippi was equivalent to
his obtaining a Missouri judgment upon the Mississippi judgment
on the date of registration; therefore, Missouri's ten-year limit upon
execution of judgments of its own courts is controlling.8
There has been a gradual expansion of the extraterritorial enforcement remedies available to judgment creditors in some commonlaw jurisdictions. In 1801 England initiated a judgment registration
procedure which today covers the various units of the Empire. 4 It
allows a judgment creditor to file a certified copy of the judgment of
one Empire court in a court of another Empire country and to
execute upon it there as if it had originally been rendered in the
second forum. 5 Australia and Canada have statutes establishing a
similar procedure among their states and provinces. 0 In the United
States, however, the most common ritual for enforcing a judgment
of the court of one state in a sister state is more complex. The
original judgment is made the basis of a cause of action in the
second state resulting in the rendition of a second judgment, and
it is upon this judgment that execution finally issues.7 Since this
procedure is burdensome and expensive, attempts have been made
to provide alternative methods of enforcing foreign judgments. A
number of states allow the judgment creditor to move for summary
judgment and thus obtain relief without a full trial, 8 while others
3. See note 2 supra. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.350 (1949) provides: "[A]fter the expira•
tion of ten years from the date of the original rendition or revival [of a judgment in
Missouri] • • • such judgment shall be conclusively presumed to be paid, and no execution, or order or process shall issue thereon, nor shall any suit be brought, had or
maintained thereon for any purpose whatever."
4. The development is found in these statutes: The Crown Debts Act, 1801, 41 Geo.
3, c. 90; The Judgments Extension Act, 1868, 31 &: 32 Viet., c. 54: The Inferior
Courts Judgments Extension Act, 1882, 45 &: 46 Viet., c. 31; Administration of Justice
Act, 1920, IO &: 11 Geo. 5, c. 81.
5. The most recent legislation, the Administration of Justice Act, 1920, 10 &: 11
Geo. 5, c. 81, provides that from the date of its registration under the act a judgment
is "of the same force and effect, and proceedings may be taken thereon, as if it had
been a judgment originally obtained or entered upon the day of registration in the
registering court"
6. Service and Executions of Process Act, 1901-1912, II Co111. Acts 291 (Australia);
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgment Act, REv. STAT. ONT, 1937, c. 124 (Ont,), See
generally Leflar, The New Uniform Foreign Judgments Act, 24 N.Y.U.L. REV, 336,
345 n.25 (1949).
7. See Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (1890); McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v.
Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839); 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws § 433.1 (1935); Yntema,
The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33 MICH, L. REv.
1129, 1144 (1935).
8. Leflar, supra note 6, at 349 n.38. A summary judgment procedure allows the
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have adopted the Uniform Enforcement 0£ Foreign Judgments Act,9
permitting a judgment creditor to register his foreign judgment
in a sister state which has adopted the legislation. Since registration
itself is not equivalent to a new judgment, execution cannot immediately issue. Nevertheless, the creditor can levy at once upon
the debtor's property in the registration state to prevent him from
disposing 0£ it prior to the rendition of the second judgment.10
To facilitate the enforcement of some foreign judgments11 in
federal courts, Congress in 1948 enacted section 1963 of Title 28
of the United States Code, which provides fdr the voluntary registration in any federal district of final judgments in actions for the
recovery of money or property rendered by a federal district court
0£ any other district. The section further provides that registered
judgments are to be given the "same effect" they would have if they
had been rendered by the registration court.12 Relying upon the
quoted language, the court in the principal case concluded that
section 1963 is more than a procedural step in the process of collecting a foreign judgment in a federal court. According to its reasoning,
the registration of a foreign judgment is equivalent to the rendition
of a judgment in the second forum upon that foreign decree.18
Therefore, a foreign judgment may be registered in a federal court
sitting in a sister state at any time when suit could be commenced
upon it in the second jurisdiction. Furthermore, once a judgment
has been registered it may be satisfied during the period permitted
by the registration state for execution upon a judgment of its own
courts. Since Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure14
generally requires a federal court to follow, in matters of execution,
party seeking :recovery to moye for judgment shortly after the commencement of the
action. The motion is granted if, from the pleadings and affidavits which may be filed
by any party, it appears that there is no genuine issue of material fact. The procedure is peculiarly applicable when the cause of action is upon a foreign judgment,
since the judgment debtor's defenses are very limited. See generally Clark, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423 (1929); 33 PA. B.A.Q. 278 (1962). Similar economy
could be achieved, of course, if the judgment debtor allowed a default to be taken
against him.
·
9. 9A UNIFORM LAws ANN. 287 (1957).
10. Paulsen, Enforcing the Money Judgment of a Sister State, 42 IowA L. REY.
202·03 (1957). The author uses Tolley v. Wilson, 121 Ark. 163, 205 S.W.2d 177 (1947),
as an example of how the cumbersome nature of the formal action on the foreign
judgment gives the judgment debtor an opportunity to dispose of his assets before the
judgment creditor's claim can be satisfied.
11. Foreign judgments, within the meaning of § 1963, are those rendered by a
United States district court in another American jurisdiction; the provision does not
apply to judgments of courts of foreign countries.
12. See note 1 supra.
13. Accord, Hanes Supply Co. v. Valley Evaporating Co., 261 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1958).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 69 provides: "The procedure on executio~, in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of a judgment ••• shall be in accordance with the practice
and procedure of the state in which the distri_ct court is held • • • except that any
statute of the United States governs. to the extent that it i_s applicable.•• .''
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the practice of the state courts in the jurisdiction in which the federal
court sits-a directive which has been construed as requiring federal
courts to adhere to local time limits on executionlli-the result in the
principal case is justified if a registered judgment is in fact identical
to a judgment on a judgment.
If section 1963 was designed to make a registered judgment interchangeable with a judgment on a judgment, it failed in one potentially significant regard. A final judgment of one court may sometimes
be attacked, and its enforcement prevented, upon certain limited
grounds when the judgment creditor seeks to satisfy it in another
state.16 Ordinarily the judgment debtor may raise these defenses
when suit upon the original judgment is commenced in the second
forum, because the judgment creditor bringing the action must
observe all the formalities incident to any suit, including notification
to the judgment debtor of its pendency.17 Of course, the judgment
creditor must bring his suit in the second state within the period
allotted by the local statute of limitations. Normally, notice will be
served upon the judgment debtor shortly after the action is begun
and, in fact, must be given within a reasonable time thereafter. 18
These time limits have the combined effect of forcing the debtor,
or his representative if he is dead, to rely upon only relatively recent history to formulate a defense to the creditor's action. Indeed,
the enactment of any statute of limitations is partially motivated by
the legislature's desire that the evidence necessary to sustain the
defendant's effort to protect his rights be relatively fresh and accessible.19 The rule that notice must be given to the defendant shortly
after suit is commenced also assists in accomplishing this purpose.20
The problem toward which these measures are directed could
be most acute where the cause of action is based upon a foreign
judgment taken by default against a now deceased defendant. Unlike the situation in many types of claims against an estate where
those close to the decedent are likely to have some awareness of
the circumstances of the claim and thus a starting point from which
to build a defense in his absence, it is probable that the judgment
creditor is the only living person who knows whether the alleged
judgment debtor was properly served with the process of a court
which had jurisdiction prior to default. Section 1963, however,
15. Miller v. United States, 160 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1947).
16. The judgment debtor may defend on such grounds as lack of jurisdiction in
the original court, fraud in obtaining the judgment, or prior satisfaction of the judg•
ment. See generally REsTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 4-11 (1942); id., Explanatory Notes
§ 47(e) (1942).
17. See Leflar, supra note 6, at 346--48; Paulsen, supra note 10, at 202; Yntcma,
. supra note 7, at 1144.
18. See Murphy v. Citizens Bank, 244 F.2d 5ll, 512 (10th Cir. 1957): Hoffman v.
Wair, 193 F. Supp. 727, 733 (D. Ore. 1961); 9 MD. L. REv, 74, 77-78 (1948).
19. See Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 814 (1944).
20. See Barthel v. Stamm, 145 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir. 1944).
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leaves the judgment debtor at a disadvantage because it lacks a
provision requiring that notice of the fact of registration be given .
him at the time registration occurs. Unless he happens to discover
that a judgment against him has been registered, therefore, a judgment debtor would not necessarily become aware of the claim until
execution-when his property is actually seized or when, as in the
principal case, he receives notice of the creditor's intention to
take his deposition to uncover assets.
As construed by the principal case, section 1963 allows registration of a foreign judgment any time within the registration state's
statute of limitations applicable to suits upon such judgments, and
execution upon it any time thereafter within the period allowed- by
the same state's statute for execution upon judgments of its own
courts. Had the appellant in the principal case both registered his
judgment and sought execution upon it at the latest dates permissible under the court's interpretation of section 1963, almost
seventeen years21 would have elapsed from the date the original
judgment was rendered to its execution or until appellee would
necessarily have received notice that a purportedly valid claim was
pending against him. Thus, notice could have been delayed years
beyond the deadline applicable if the judgment creditor had been
forced to rely upon the traditional enforcement process requiring
him to sue on the original judgment in Missouri within ten years
after its rendition in Mississippi, and to serve process within a reasonable time after commencing the Missouri suit.
Enforcement procedures analogous to section 1963 require that
a judgment debtor be given notice of the claim against him and an
opportunity to defend his interests at the time of registration. The
English Administration of Justice Act, which is quite similar in
many respects to section 1963,22 demands that the registration court
make rules "for the service on the judgment debtor of notice of
the registration of the judgment."23 Similar notice requirements
currently a part of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act have been kept intact in the Commissioner's proposed revision,
which is designed to make registration under the act equivalent to
the rendition of a final judgment in the registration state. This effect
of the proposed revision is in explicit imitation of section 1963 as
the Commissioners interpreted it even before the instant decision. 24
21. The judgment creditor could register his judgment just within the seven-year
limit from the date of its rendition in Mississippi set by MISS. ConE ANN. ch. 2, § 733
(1942), and made applicable in Missouri by the latter's borrowing statute, Mo. REv.
STAT. § 516.180 (1949). He would then have an additional ten years to execute upon
it under Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.350 (1949). See notes 2 &: 3 supra.
22. See note 5 supra.
23. 10 &: 11 Geo. 5, c. 81, pt. II, § 9(4).
24. ALI, REPORT OF 11lE COMMI'lTEE To COOPERATE WlTII 11lE ALI OF 11lE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAW 94, 290-91 (1964). Even though
registration is equivalent to a final judgment under the proposed revision, individual
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The court in the principal case construed the statute before it
in the way most beneficial to judgment creditors. Certainly no fault
can be found with this, for the section was designed to assist creditors
in enforcing judgments. An amendment to section 1963 modeled on
the notice provisions of the Administration of Justice Act or the
Uniform Act, however, would guarantee that no unwarranted benefit to the judgment creditor could be gained at the expense of his
debtor. In the meantime, courts should be reluctant to view the
principal case as meaningful precedent unless they are satisfied that
the judgment debtor has not been prejudiced by the delaying of
notification of his opponent's claim beyond the time he would have
received it were there no federal registration of judgments legislation.

state legislatures may elect, under proposed § 3(c), to suspend execution for a limited
period after registration, presumably to allow the judgment debtor to raise any defenses he may have to the original judgment before the registered judgment is satisfied.

